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摘  要 




从而助长管理层机会主义、产生代理问题。于是本文基于 Berle 和 Means

































As at 31 December 2014, 114 listed companies in China’s A-share market do not 
have actual controllers. Majority of the shareholding structures among these companies 
are diversified; the proportion of stakes in the largest shareholders’hands remain below 
20 percent on average. Studies subject to matured capital markets have found that 
decentralized ownership weakens supervisions from external shareholders and thus 
result in agency problem. This paper is motivated by Berle and Means’ Principal-agent 
theory. We will study the sequential effects of no controllers on managers’ behaviors 
from the incentive contracts’ point of view. 
The empirical research applies linear regression model to two samples. We will 
divide the listed companies from 2004 to 2014 into two groups by the existence of 
actual controllers. The purpose of controlling the existence of actual controllers is to 
testify if lack of actual controllers result in increase in agency costs; and if the optimal 
contract is effective. Lastly, we will evaluate how well internal governance resolves the 
agency dilemma.  
We argue that firms without actual controllers have higher agency costs, and the 
managers’ pay-performance sensitives are low. The manager’s compensation 
fluctuation and the profit fluctuation are highly asymmetric. This phenomenon implies 
the agency costs are even higher as the agents are acting in their own interests. At the 
corporate governance level, increasing the proportion of stakes in managers’ hand and 
introducing institutional investors could relief the agency problem. 
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控制人，研究维度主要承袭 La Porta 等学者开创的 LLSV（La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny R.W.）[4]范式，主要为探讨实际控制人性质、实现
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